In late AD 9, the Roman Empire suffered one of its most devastating defeats. The massacre of three legions, XVII, XVIII, and XIX, occurred in the Teutoburg Forest of Germania Magna, an area roughly corresponding to modern-day Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria. The primary sources that discuss the event, including Cassius Dio, Velleius Paterculus, Florus, and Tacitus, either provide little analysis or we’re missing parts of their work. The bits we do have are colored with the bias of the writer, favoring whichever emperor was current. None of the primary sources were at the massacre. However, Paterculus was a Roman cavalry officer who served in Germania. He personally knew many of the officers of the lost legions, including their leader, Varus. Dio, Florus, and Tacitus, like Paterculus, probably did have access to survivor testimonies.
The Roman Empire in 9 AD was at its peak. Rome dominated the known civilized world due to Augustus’s Pax Romana. Still, there was constant conflict on the frontiers along the rivers Rhine, Danube, and Euphrates in the east. Instead of being continuously on the offensive, the legions were primarily stationed in outposts. Some redoubts, like Xanten, accommodated two whole legions. (Murdock, 248) These forts lined the banks of the Rhine.
Once Drusus Germanicus (stepson of Augustus) began his campaign east into Germania Magna (12 to 8 BC), he built forts along the Weser, Lippe, and Ems rivers to establish Roman authority in the region. Drusus gained his surname in multiple battles against various Germanic tribes, pushing the Roman frontier from the Rhine to the Danube and Elbe. By AD 9, Roman authority extended to the line of forts established by Drusus. However, after his last campaign, and on his way back to the Rhine forts, Drusus fell from his horse, received a fatal wound, and passed away shortly afterward. His brother Tiberius, the future emperor, took command and consolidated his brother’s gains.
The Romans recognized that making Germania Magna a Roman province would be a challenging endeavor. However, the primary objective of Roman expansion was to conquer a region and integrate it into the Roman Empire. To make it Roman, they had to convince the locals that their brand of civilization was more appealing than the ‘barbarism’ they were accustomed to. The Roman conquest and subsequent pillage and taxation led to a greater influx of denarii into imperial coffers, but the going was tough. Both Drusus, before his death, and Tiberius, after, found that getting the Germanic tribes to submit and stay that way was nearly impossible. One of the problems lay in the Germanic barbarian way of life.
The Germanic tribes of the early first century did not live in population centers like the Romans or Gaul’s. Most of them resided in simple huts and were primarily pastoralists, subsisting on cattle. Since they weren’t tied to the land by agriculture, at the first sign of trouble, tribesmen could pack their essential belongings and disappear into the vastness of Germania. It was also difficult to tie down the tribal forces into a set-piece battle that could decide the issue. The German tribesmen were able to vanish, re-form, and establish new villages. Strabo, the first-century Roman Greek geographer, described the Germans as little different “from the Celtic tribes (being fiercer, bigger, and blonder), but they are similar in other respects.” Strabo noted that the Suebi were the strongest of the Germanic tribes. The Cherusci, the tribe at the center of the Teutoburg massacre, didn’t make the cut, and he listed them as one of the poorer Germanic nations. (Strabo, 346)
Andrew Young conducted an economic analysis of the self-governance institutions of Germanic tribes during their development and evolution from the first century BC to the first century AD. He talks about two distinct assemblies of authority within the tribe: the Assembly of Warriors (comprising all freemen) and the Council of Leading Men (the elite). The Germanic tribes didn’t have governments per se, but they did have institutions of self-governance. Caesar’s campaign in Gaul (58-50 BC) significantly transformed the region’s economic landscape, which was crucial for the substantial changes in Germanic governance. (Young, 3) Caesar didn’t get far into Germania at the time, but the changes he brought to Gaul steadily spread east over the Rhine. After Caesar consolidated Gaul, many of the Germanic tribes on the Rhinal rim took the bait and began trading and interacting with the Romans. Other tribes, like the Suebi, maintained their distance.
Early Roman incursions across the Rhine did not initially threaten the independence of the Germanic tribes. However, exposure to new sources of wealth gradually shifted the Romans’ expansionistic goals. A century later, the Roman historian Tacitus noted changes in Germanic governance, which included the election of temporary military leaders from the nobility, retinues led by professional commanders, and more frequent public assemblies. While the nobility gained greater authority in the assemblies, they surrendered control of land. (Young, 4) However, the introduction of Romans into the Germanic world disrupted their fragile balance of power. While their initial interactions boded well for the Romans, difficulties arose with the introduction of taxation and the implementation of the Roman judicial system, which alienated both the German elite and ordinary people. Tribes like the Cherusci feigned cooperation with the Romans but were never fully subjugated – that required boots on the ground. Crucially, Arminius, a Cheruscan noble and Roman-trained auxiliary commander, outwardly supported Varus, legate of Germania Magna (The Roman emperor’s immediate subordinate in the region), but covertly worked to unite the various Germanic tribes in opposition.
Among the Germanic tribes, common ownership of land and inadequate weaponry hindered the establishment of a ruling class. Warbands, or raiding parties, were formed on an ad hoc basis by any local leader with sufficient prestige to attract followers. These groups usually dissolved once they achieved their objectives. After disbanding, the warriors returned to their ordinary lives as pastoralists. As a result, there was a lack of aristocrats whom the Romans could pressure, bribe, or assassinate. (Plant, 83) The Romans were limited to interactions with tribal chiefs. When unrest inevitably erupted, the Roman commander on the scene not only had to eliminate the enemy warband quickly but also had to capture the leader.
The man who would lead the Roman legions into disaster was Publius Quinctilius Varus. He came from a respectable background and was well-established in the Julian royal family. In 13 BC, he served as consul alongside his brother-in-law, the future emperor Tiberius. (Murdock, 55) After this, Varus held three foreign postings, including Syria, Africa, and Judea, where he successfully suppressed a rebellion. In AD 6 or 7, Augustus appointed Varus as legate of Germania (legatus Augusti pro praetore), making him the Imperial representative in Germany. (McNally, 32) He acted as second-in-command to Tiberius, who was in the planning stages of a campaign against Maroboduus, the king of the Marcomanni, located in what is now the western Czech Republic.
Velleius Paterculus didn’t speak favorably of Varus. He accused Varus of enriching himself during his governorship of Syria, declaring “he entered this rich province a poor man, and left this poor province a rich man.” (VP, 2.117.2) Paterculus charged Varus with approaching his German assignment like an amateur. Most ancient sources agree with Paterculus and generally criticize Varus; however, some of this disapproval may serve as a cover, often for the reigning emperor, Tiberius, in Paterculus’ case. Adrian Murdock asks the critical question: Would Augustus have appointed an incompetent person to such a critical front? Murdock didn’t think so. (Murdock, 49) Varus’ performance as governor of Syria and Judea was standard in the eyes of Augustus, and Germania would be a logical next step on the imperial cursus honorum.
Alongside Tiberius, Varus was in command of Legions XVII, XVIII, and XIX, including Legion I Germanica and Legion V “The Larks.” Together with the numerous auxiliary units, Varus’ task force fielded about 60,000 men. (Murdock, 68) However, a revolt in Pannonia (AD 6 to 9) diverted the attention of Tiberius and his massive task force of ten to fifteen legions. Excessive Roman demands for conscripts and taxes triggered revolt and presented one of the most serious threats Augustus faced during his long reign. As Tiberius diverted to Pannonia (parts of modern-day Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), Varus marched his task force to the German frontier to begin the process of Romanization. The emperor must have felt it was time to finalize the deal and turn Germania Magna into a Roman province.
Varus’ first duty as governor was to secure the province militarily against internal and external threats. He did this by cracking down on crime, arresting robbers, arranging security patrols to escort provision trains, and garrisoning soldiers in undefended communities. The Roman forts established on the east side of the Rhine relied on an intricate system of supply, rotation, and reinforcement to maintain their presence and project power. This was a primary concern for Varus as he consolidated his command. His second task, the most crucial to the empire’s goals, was to transform Germania Magna into a province by implementing the lex provinciae, the Roman Empire’s legal code. This included a tax system that likely faced opposition from the Germanic tribes. (Murdock, 70)
Arminius was the central figure of the opposition. He is a perfect example of what the Romans sought to achieve. He was also a contradiction of sorts. Arminius was heir to one of the most influential Cheruscan chieftains but was also educated and spent most of his life in Rome as a foreign hostage. The Romans provided a life and identity for the young man. Arminius became a member of the equestrian order and served with distinction as an officer of auxiliaries. (McNally, 29) In AD 9, he served as a cavalry prefect under Varus. In the untamed lands of Germania Magna, the Romans hoped this shining example of Romanization would re-embed in their tribes and provide the eyes, ears, and authority the empire needed to subdue the territory. At least that was the Roman objective. And it had worked numerous times in other regions, such as Gaul and the East.
Arminius was intimately familiar with Roman strategy against barbarian tribes. The brutality of the Pannonian War served as his training ground. Varus was following a clearly established pattern that Arminius recognized, allowing him to plan accordingly. The exact reason for Arminius turning against Rome is unknown, but it shouldn’t come as a complete shock. The introduction of Roman legions to Germania was brutal for anyone who encountered them. Arminius was German; these were his people. The first thing he needed to do was establish contact with chieftains known to be hostile to Rome. That wouldn’t be hard, considering the last two decades of war. Without the support of other tribes, even the united Cherusci could not defeat Varus on their own. And the longer it took to gather his allies, the greater the chance of his plans being discovered. (McNally, 31)
Arminius also knew he could not conduct a protracted campaign. The battle had to be quick and decisive, before Roman superiority could be brought to bear, as had been the case in previous encounters. His strategy hinged on three parts. First, the Roman assumption that they were operating in either allied or pacified territory; second, his ability to convince Varus to establish his summer camp, castrum aestivum, within Cheruscan lands, where it could be observed and monitored. Lastly, he had to encourage Varus to prolong his stay at the summer camp. Arminius likely achieved success by appealing to Varus’ perceived goal of promoting ‘Romanization.’ The longer Varus could be kept from returning to his winter camps, castra hiberna, along the Rhine, the greater the likelihood of unrest growing among the tribes. (McNally, 31)
The only warning Varus received of anything out of the ordinary came in the form of a pro-Roman noble named Segestes. Segestes was a Cheruscan chieftain who also happened to be Arminius’ father-in-law. He was one of the few pro-Roman nobles among the Cherusci. When Varus established his summer camp, Segestes, who was aware of Arminius’ plans, brought it to Varus’ attention. But Arminius played it cool, and Varus trusted Arminius’ word over Segestes, much to his detriment. Arminius was a veteran of Roman campaigns, while Segestes was the unknown foreigner, so it made sense that Varus would take Arminius’ side over Segestes. The animosity between Arminius and Segestes stemmed from Arminius eloping with Segestes’ daughter, Thusnelda, without his blessing. Both Thusnelda and Segestes would play significant parts in the war to come.
How did the Romans arrive at their final destination before the disaster struck?
In the winter of AD 8/9, Varus sent instructions to his senior subordinates. First, the commanders of Legions XVII and XIX were to arrange for garrisons, possibly one cohort (approximately 480 men) per location, to secure their winter camps and the Rhine frontier. The rest of the task force would march to Xanten to unite with the rest of the army. The auxiliary troops received similar orders, while a portion remained west of the Rhine to reinforce local military districts along the Gallic frontier. Varus’ plan was straightforward. The army would depart Xanten and cross the Rhine to the eastern bank, then enter the valley of the Lippe, the traditional route used by Roman forces to traverse the interior of Trans-Rhinal Germany. (McNally, 32)
The army followed the Lippe River while elements of the Classis Germanica, a small river fleet based at Xanten, shadowed their progress and transported supplies and equipment as needed. They marched past the line of outposts established by Varus’s predecessors, which were still in active service. As the column passed these outposts, the army would resupply and rotate the garrisons with men and supplies from the column. Once they reached the upper reaches of the Lippe, they would pivot northeast towards the lands of the Cherusci. They would then identify a proper location for a summer camp to serve as the base of operations for the rest of the campaigning season. From this summer camp, Varus could meet with delegations from local tribes that remained wary of the Romans.
The date of Varus’ departure from Xanten is unknown. He likely went with the onset of the campaigning season, which began in March in the Roman calendar and concluded in October. Varus probably planned an operation lasting no longer than five months. He wanted his troops to return to winter quarters before the onset of winter. (McNally, 33) As they moved through the valley of the Lippe, the army arrived at the site of an earlier marching camp at Holsterhausen, 20 miles east of Xanten. From there, they marched another day to Aliso, the main Roman base on the Lippe. The Romans had built Aliso on a series of hills overlooking the river. East of the camp was another fort, constructed directly on the riverbank, and protected on three sides by a ditched and embanked rampart. Several covered slipways and sheds served as an advanced station for the Rhine fleet. (McNally, 37)
Varus extended the army’s rest time at Aliso for a few days to await reports from his forward scouts. While they rested, he likely set up various planning meetings with his subordinates and the officers in charge of providing naval support. Varus’ task force was not as large as standard Roman combat formations on campaign, but his column still required substantial supplies; about 40 tons of grain, fodder, and more per day. These supplies had to be readily stockpiled and hauled to other bases further along the river. Varus didn’t just want these supplies waiting for him as he passed; he wanted to ensure a suitable reserve at the final encampment. This approach would give him the full use of his baggage train to move supplies the short distance from the Lippe to his future summer camp. (McNally, 37)
The Romans marched east along the meandering valley, with cargo vessels passing between Aliso and whichever encampment they encountered. They passed Beckinghausen and Oberaden on the south bank before reaching Anreppen, about ten miles from the source of the Lippe and possibly the last link in a chain of fortifications stretching back 100 miles to the winter camps along the Rhine. Varus established his forward supply base there, where waterborne cargo from Aliso and the ports along the Rhine could be unloaded and stored before being transported up to the summer camp on the Weser. They probably rested in Aliso for a few days, as they did at other previous strongpoints. The next leg of the journey took the army into Barbaricum proper, but McNally suggests that this probably occurred after the start of April. (McNally, 38)
As the army departed familiar surroundings around Aliso, they encountered more difficult terrain. The column snaked northwards for over a week, strung along a tract that in no way resembled the roads the legionnaires were used to. The final location of Varus’ summer camp is unknown, but it may lie somewhere under the streets of Minden, north of Barkhausen. Riding at the front of the column, Arminius may have sent a rider back to the advance guard announcing the prospective campsite. Since the Romans were in “friendly” territory and Arminius was an “ally,” the standard procedure of deploying cavalry and infantry for defense was likely disregarded, establishing a dangerous precedent. (McNally, 39) That would bring Roman sources into harmony regarding Varus’s lack of military competence.
McNally suggests Varus was at this forward base for just over four months. (McNally, 39) Arminius used this time to perfect his plans, consolidating local support while seeking allies among the other tribes. As the months passed, the Germans lulled the Romans into a false sense of security. Cassius Dio charges Varus with acting as a political rather than a military commander. However, as June turned into July, Arminius had to devise a plan quickly to persuade the Romans to delay their departure for the Rhine. Not only that, but he had to get Varus to change the axis of his return route to a path specifically chosen by Arminius. Arminius arranged for his allies, either the Angrivarii or Bructeri, to launch raids into Cheruscan territory. When reports of the raids filtered in, Arminius could justify sending troops to defend Cherusci communities. (McNally, 44)
Varus made a tough decision; instead of marching back to the Rhine, the legions would trek out to handle the unrest directly. Stamp out the rebellion, acquire booty, and be back in winter quarters before winter. It was supposed to be a standard Roman campaign. Adrian Murdock suggests this is when Varus sent Arminius ahead to gather more troops and assess the situation. As the legions departed their summer camp heading north-west, they had no idea what was waiting for them. The sources generally disparage Varus for this particular leg of the journey. The allegation is that his army lacked tactical integrity and was not marching in full readiness. His baggage train contained many civilians, including women and children from the camp, who were intermixed among the legionnaires. However, Murdock also argues that Varus believed he was marching through friendly territory. (Murdock, 103)
Regardless of the poor organization of Varus’s column, to actually see the Roman army march out of their summer camp would be breathtaking. The column probably extended from 8 to 10 kilometers. Lightly armed auxiliaries and archers filled the vanguard. They operated as scouts, identifying potential trouble spots and eliminating them. Arminius was likely part of this vanguard. It makes sense that you’d have the most experienced men, familiar with the landscape and people, ensuring the path forward was clear. (Murdock, 103)
Following them came heavy infantry and cavalry, who functioned as a quick reaction force to any attack on the vanguard. Behind them were engineers and men from each legion, carrying flags. These flags would mark out the boundaries of the next camp while the flag bearers also ensured the next camp had access to firewood for the legionnaires, fodder for the horses, and water for both. The engineers worked on the route ahead, ensuring the army and supply train made steady progress. They also removed logs strewn along the tract, cut down trees, and built or rebuilt bridges over rivers and marshland. (Murdock, 103) Bad terrain and obstructions could hold up a large column for hours, which made engineers essential personnel. These were country paths, not the paved, cambered roads the Romans were used to. (Murdock, 104)
The main body followed, marching six abreast behind the trumpeters, many of them clad in the new, segmented armor called lorica segmentata. This armor was a technological innovation that provided soldiers with more flexibility and protection. It was also lighter than the ring armor worn up to this period, weighing 9 kg (19.8 lbs) compared to 16 kg (35.2 lbs). Centurions like modern-day First Sergeants kept a close eye on their legionnaires. We know the names of some of the centurions in Varus’ army, including Marcus Caelius and Fabricius. (Murdock, 104) Centurions were the backbone of the legion. They had a multifaceted role, leading in combat, maintaining discipline, and administering justice within their century (80-100 legionnaires), depending on period and circumstance.
After the main body, the bulk of the army had passed. The rearguard came next, which included slaves leading the mules carrying the legionnaires’ baggage, followed by infantry and cavalry acting as the rearguard. The total number of men in Varus’ task force has been a topic of debate for many years. Velleius Paterculus says, ‘three legions, the same number of divisions of cavalry and six cohorts.’ That would put Varus’s task force at around 18,000 legionaries, some 900 cavalry, and 3,600 auxiliaries. But accuracy is wanting. Estimated troop numbers in the ancient world were notoriously unreliable. (Murdock, 5)
Arminius departed the column at some point before the first strike. According to Col. Malleson, a British officer, Arminius broke off without notifying Varus. (Malleson, 74) Murdock, the more reliable source, suggests that towards the end of the day, the vanguard, consisting of Arminius and his auxiliaries, begged Varus to be excused. As the advanced team, they wanted to break off and mobilize the other tribal auxiliaries in support of Varus and clear the rest of the way for the army. It was standard procedure to allow the advance guard to scout ahead. Varus’ intelligence sources had thus far failed to provide forewarning of the tribal uprising, except for that presented by Segestes. Therefore, it’s reasonable, for appearance’s sake, that Arminius was simply on a fact-finding and mobilization mission. The issue was that Varus chose someone plotting his downfall. (Murdock, 106)
Regardless of when he left, Arminius and his Cheruscan auxiliaries departed the Roman main body and rendezvoused with three tribes, the Cherusci, the Bructeri, and the Marsi (Murdock, 106). The Roman army, meanwhile, built its first camp, the one seen by Germanicus on his trail of Roman vengeance about six years later. According to Tacitus, this first camp had a wide circumference; the measurements of its central space indicate it was built for three legions. There was no evidence they were under attack at this point. Centurions, like Marcus Caelius, posted sentries, cavalrymen attended to their horses, and legionnaires erected tents and ate rations, all part of the routine of the Roman army on the move. It was the calm before a storm. (Murdock, 106)
The attack began the following afternoon. Arminius had done an excellent job of obscuring his intentions while Varus struggled to gain reliable, actionable intelligence. The Roman detachments sent to protect local communities were already dead. Roman sources describe the terrain as rugged, more mountainous and forested than the legions were used to. Forward detachments stayed busy clearing a path for the army. But as they approached the Wiehengebirge mountain chain, the weather took a turn for the worse. Lashing rain and wind quickly turned into a storm of magnitude.
The storm front blowing off the North Sea steadily chipped away at both light and hope, bringing the long column to a slow walk, followed by a standstill. The weather, combined with thousands of humans, animals, and equipment, turned the wild tract into a muddy quagmire. Wagons dragging artillery and carts got stuck as the ground became slippery and the mud thickened. Forward movement continued to stall as the wind brought down treetops across their path, forcing delays as the engineers had to clear them. (Murdock, 107)
The Roman army suffered its first defeat east of Kalkriese. Arminius knew he didn’t stand a chance of beating the Romans if they were defending a camp. That’s why he let them march out and let nature wear them down first. The first attack struck when the soldiers were wet, tired, miserable, and anticipating rest and their evening meal. When they attacked, the Germans stormed from all sides, surrounding the army along the forest tract. The only escape route, the way they came, was now blocked off. Murdock estimates that Arminius’ forces numbered approximately 15,000, based on a population density analysis of 750 settlements from the period. (Murdock, 107)
The sky, already black with storm clouds, darkened further as German spears rained down on the beleaguered Roman army. In such a confined space, Roman cavalry became useless. Even with a height advantage and protected by superior armor, the Germans targeted the horses, which led to wounded animals slipping in the mud, rearing, throwing their riders, and galloping uncontrolled into their own infantry lines. (Rost, 119) Usually, the cavalry would react by deploying a protective screen with detachments on all sides. But that was impossible to form in the forest under constant pressure from all sides. But the infantry surely didn’t have it any easier. They struggled to form properly over the terrain and became disorganized, mixing with the civilians and their own baggage wagons. Murdock found it curious that Varus organized his supply train so badly. (Murdock, 109)
Cassius Dio writes:
“The Romans were not proceeding in any regular order but were mixed in helter-skelter with the wagons and the unarmed, and so, unable to form readily anywhere in a body, and being fewer at every point than their assailants, they suffered greatly and could offer no resistance at all.”
Despite the shock of the first assault, Murdock suggests Varus reacted with control and presence of mind. He started by taking the only logical step available to him. He built a camp. However, the luxury of plotting a camp in normal conditions was inapplicable. The enemy was everywhere, like a pulsing scythe; the Germans struck in mass and withdrew just as quickly. Before the Romans could recover, another wave. To even begin the process of digging a ditch, building ramparts, and erecting palisades, the cavalry and half the infantry would have to stand to, battle-ready, protecting their colleagues who were performing the work. In normal conditions, it took legionnaires three to five hours to dig a ditch. During a heavy storm and under attack from all sides, Murdock wondered if they persevered or did the bare minimum. (Murdock, 110)
The gravity of the situation is evident in Varus’s order to burn the baggage train and abandon everything unnecessary, including any remaining civilians. However, Murdock also suggests that Varus, at this point, had no reason to think the army wouldn’t survive. He bought himself some breathing room by building a camp they could defend. There was little chance the Germans would attack the Roman camp directly. That evening, the senior officers likely met to formulate a plan of action, such as attempting to move towards the river, where they could obtain transportation to Haltern and then proceed to Xanten. (Murdock, 110) Should they stay and try to get a runner through German lines, or take their chances and make a run for it?
The next morning, the Romans departed their camp and marched towards the oak-covered slopes of the Kalkriese Berg. Murdock notes that Arminius, at this point, would have known with certainty that this was the general direction the Romans would take. He didn’t need to lure them in this direction or force them into a corridor: Murdock says, “They were always going to come this way.” This spot was where the main west-east routes from the mid-Weser to the lower Rhine converged. More difficult terrain to the north and south hemmed in the Romans, forcing them to this path. This route remained a primary pathway in the region until 1845 and was marked on maps of that time as the Alte Herrestraße, meaning the Old Military Road. (Murdock, 110)
As the Romans rounded the Kalkriese Berg, they approached a narrow pass called the Kalkriese-Niederweder-Senke, a mountain rising 110 meters above the pass to the south, and the Great Moor to the north. This ground was ideal terrain for an ambush. It was a narrow corridor, approximately six kilometers long and only one kilometer wide. However, the water table at the time was high, which would have made it passable only at the edges and on the ridges of sand that accumulated, approximately 200 meters wide. (Wells, 73) The Romans had no other option; they had to march through the narrow space under the observant eye of the oddly shaped hills. With the nearest Roman relief forces 100 kilometers south and west, there was no chance for rescue.
The Germans harassed Varus’s column the entire way. They found no value in standing their ground against the heavily armored legionnaires. Instead, they relied on ferocious hit-and-run tactics, which took their toll on the Romans. However, the casualties the Romans faced up to this point paled in comparison to what was to come next. Archaeologists have thoroughly explored the site, and their findings support the claim that a fierce battle took place at this location. (Wilbers-Rost, 3) Arminius attacked here with the full weight and fury of the German warriors with him. (Murdock, 111)
Arminius planned this battle meticulously. Before the fight, the Cheruscan commander had lined the pass with arc-shaped turf walls and sand ramparts that curved with the shape of the hill. To date, three have been found, with a total length of four hundred meters. The wall was 1.5 meters high and three meters wide, with passageways built along its length for the Germans to assault through and withdraw as needed. (Wilbers-Rost, 4) The style of the walls was initially considered Roman, resembling a hastily constructed Roman defensive position. However, it may simply be a case of Roman military tactics influencing Arminius. The construction of the walls preserved the element of surprise for the Germans while also narrowing the pass. (Murdock, 112)
It was here that the worst of the fighting took place and where the most Roman casualties occurred. The human remains found at Kalkriese provide an HD snapshot of the thousands who died. Almost all the remains were those of men of military age, between 20 and 40 years old. Any women and children with the army were probably dead by this point. All of the remains found at Kalkriese died from offensive weapons, many from sword cuts. (Murdock, 113) In Wilbers-Rost’s investigation, they found individual skeletons that exhibited a high level of robustness and no signs of physical disability. Three of the skulls showed clear evidence of injuries caused by traumatic blows. (Wilbers-Rost, 10) The Roman historian Velleius Paterculus was the only contemporary source of the battle, and he served as a cavalry officer in the German theater. He probably had a good idea of what combat looked like in the forests of Germania Magna.
“The Germans rushed forward with more haste than caution, brandishing their weapons and throwing themselves on our squadrons of horses with horrible grinding of teeth and more than their usual fury. Their hair streamed behind them and a kind of madness flashed from their eyes. Our men faced them stubbornly, protecting their heads with their shields and trying to strike fear into the foe with drawn swords or the deadly javelins they brandished.” (Vellius Paterculus)
The situation was the worst-case scenario for the Romans. There was nowhere to run, and they couldn’t reform properly in such terrain, conditions, and circumstances. Roman remains found behind the wall, near the drainage ditch, attest to at least part of the army going on the offensive. Murdock described the scene as resembling an attempt to scramble over the makeshift wall to reach their attackers. The earth rampart, built without wooden supports, eventually collapsed, perhaps during the battle. Although this moment appears dire for the active participants, the collapse of the wall proved highly beneficial for archaeology and posterity. (Murdock, 113)
The history of great battles usually focuses on the human aspect. We often forget the impact of the many animals that served ancient armies. In 1992, archaeologists discovered the remains of a mule, specifically its skull, vertebrae, and shoulder blade, along with pendants and decorative glass pearls that had fallen off its mountings. This example not only provides evidence of the chaos of the moment but also illustrates the close relationship between the owner and the animal. The iron clapper on the bronze bell hung around the mule’s neck had been filled with a handful of oats that its owner grabbed from a passing field. It was a testament to the need to keep the column moving as quietly as possible. Analysis of the oats provided the date for the battle, September. In the chaos of battle, the mule broke free from its wagon or cart while still wearing its metal harness, iron ring snaffles, and iron rein chains. It fell in front of the wall, which collapsed on top of it, preserving its remains for us today. (Murdock, 114)
In late 2000, archeologists found an almost complete skeleton of a mule at the western end of the wall. Its head was facing west and its feet south. In the moment of death, the mule’s jaws were still clamped on the snaffle. The animal tried to escape over the wall and probably broke its neck in the fall. The Germans built the wall here with sand reinforced with sandstone. When it fell, during or after the battle, the rubble of the wall naturally protected its body from plunder and scavenging animals. Murdock includes a quote from Susanne Wilbers-Rost that sums up the importance of the find: “In Kalkriese, the collapsed wall has permitted the preservation of snapshots, which are otherwise discovered only rarely in archaeology.” (Murdock, 114)
The archeological finds are not limited to the foot of the Kalkriese mountain, as might be expected from an army trying to force itself through the pass. Traces were discovered branching off away from the main body in a two-kilometer-wide strip leading northeast to the edge of the Great Moor. That means part of the army broke off to escape along the sandbars through the boggy forest. (Wells, 40) Could this have been the flight of Numonius Vala, Varus’ cavalry prefect? We will probably never know. But in Velleius Paterculus’ account, Varus’ legate did try to escape with the cavalry. Paterculus attempts to persuade the reader that Vala was deserting the legionnaires and making a run for the Rhine and Roman zone. But for all we know, Varus could have ordered Vala to take off with the cavalry. In the narrows, the cavalry was a liability and could offer no capability worth retaining. Regardless, Vala and his troops didn’t make it far and were slaughtered to a man. (Murdock, 115)
The fourth day brought even worse weather. The wind continued to blow violently, making Roman javelins and archers practically useless. “The rain had soaked through the leather of the heavy Roman shields into the wood, making exhausted and demoralized soldiers carry even more weight.” (Murdock, 115) The Romans could no longer defend themselves properly, while the barbarians found the weather just splendid. They had light equipment while the rain, wind, and natural chaos of the moment provided cover for their hit-and-run strikes. “They could pick off the enemy and quickly retire before the sodden Romans were able to react.” The Romans must have been exhausted after marching through another sleepless night. Arminius, on the other hand, could draw on fresh men. Overnight, tribes that had initially kept their distance heavily reinforced Arminius’ ranks. (Murdock, 116)
With their ranks decimated, surrounded by increasing numbers of Germans, and the weather not letting up, Varus and his senior commanders took the unimaginable final step. The senior commanders, like probably all Roman combatants at this point, were wounded; it was just a matter of how they finished. Their chances of receiving good treatment as prisoners were nil. The dark Germanic blood rites were well known throughout the Roman world at the time. Varus and his commanders had heard stories of how the priestesses, dressed in all white, treated prisoners. It was a centuries-old practice related by the Roman geographer Strabo. “These POWs would be crowned with wreaths and then led, one by one, to platforms suspended over great bronze cauldrons into which their throats would be cut.” (Strabo, 348)
All the Romans, especially the senior officers, had to make a decision: suicide or surrender. One of the camp commanders, Ceionius, decided to surrender, while the other legionary commander, Lucius Eggius, had already been killed in battle. Varus chose to fall on his sword. After his death, the surviving Roman forces lost all hope. Some followed Varus’ example, while others gravitated toward Ceionius and surrendered. Murdock considers Cassius Dio the most reliable source on the massacre, but his manuscript cuts off around here.
“To flee was impossible, however much one might desire to do so. And so, every man and every horse was cut down without fear of resistance and the…”
Arminius had won a stunning victory. As the battle died down, the Germans transitioned to a mop-up operation. They probably treated injuries, recovered wounded, and began the honors of the dead, which included collecting weapons for burial rites, hence the lack of German artifacts on the battlefield. (Hope, 83) After Varus’ death, remnants of his command tried to burn and hide the body, but it was disinterred and mutilated by furious warriors. His corpse was decapitated and his head sent to the Marcomanni chief, Maroboduus, with an invitation to join Arminius’s rebellion against Rome. Maroboduus declined and sent the general’s head to Augustus in Rome, where it was interred in the family mausoleum. (Murdock, 117)
Of all the sources, Florus appears to be the most unreliable. But he includes a section at the end of the battle that an apparent eyewitness conveyed. And those details are rather unsettling.
“The eyes of some legionaries were put out and then after their deaths, the Germans nailed their heads prominently to trunks of trees. One of the legionary’s last sights was seeing a German soldier cut his tongue out before holding it in his hands with the words, ‘At last, you viper, you have ceased to hiss.’ He then had the further ignominy of having his mouth sewn shut.”
Having witnessed the above event, Caldus Caelius seized a section of the iron chain that he was bound to and brought it down on his head, bringing about his instant death. His comrade is the one who reported the story. (Murdock, 119) An exaggeration, or made up, maybe, but years later, when Germanicus encountered the battlefield, he found an aftermath not far off from Florus’ account.
There was no hope for freedom or ransom for Ceionius and the other surviving senior officers. In the groves nearby, the Germans set up their barbarous stone altars where they immolated tribunes and first-rank centurions. If they weren’t already dead, that was what awaited Marcus Caelius and Fabricius. Murdock suggests that the site was likely already a sacred site to the Germanic god Donar. Donar, being the god who transitioned to become Thor, the Hollywood character that kids dress as on Halloween. The Germans were using Kalkriese as a memorial to celebrate their victory over the Romans. When Germanicus marched to the site in AD 15, he would set up his own monument to the lost legions. It wouldn’t last.
The best-known artifact from the battle is the 17 cm-tall iron cavalry face mask that is also the logo of the on-site museum. It gazes ominously at the observer with a story all its own. Originally covered with silver leaf, the mask belonged to an auxiliary cavalryman from Gaul or Thrace. It’s considered the oldest preserved mask of its kind. (Murdock, 120) But for evidence of the battle itself, the most impressive archaeological discovery is the cenotaph of Marcus Caelius, the centurion from Legion XVIII. It’s one of the best examples of Roman sculptures made north of the Alps. The cenotaph was discovered in 1620 and portrays Marcus and two of his freedmen. He’s shown with several decorations: a corona civilis – received for saving the life of a citizen, two torques of gold on his shoulders, armillae on his wrists, and five phalera on his chest. The monument answered the critical question of which units participated in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. The lower half is missing, but the relief and inscription remain intact.
To Marcus Caelius, son of Titus, of the Lemonian district, from Bologna, first centurion of the eighteenth legion. 53½ years old. He fell in the Varian War. His bones may be interred here. Publius Caelius, son of Titus, of the Lemonian district, his brother, erected (this monument) (Livius.org)
The Battle of Teutoburg Forest dealt a severe blow to the empire’s prestige, signaling to the rest of the world that there was a region that would not submit to Rome’s supremacy. The consequences were permanent: Germania Magna was thereafter free from the Roman yoke. (Malleson, 81) The result of the battle also forced Augustus to rethink imperial strategy. Imperial borders would stay as they were, no more expansion. And he put that in writing as instructions for the next emperor, Tiberius. Tiberius had extensive combat experience in Germania and was well aware of the difficulties involved in making any part of it Roman. So, he stayed true to Augustus’ instructions. Roman vengeance came not long after the massacre in the form of Nero Claudius Drusus Germanicus, also known simply as THE “Germanicus.”
Germanicus was the son of Drusus, the original Germanicus. He was young, military-oriented, and married to Agrippina, the granddaughter of Augustus. Augustus had Tiberius adopt Germanicus, so he was expected to one day succeed to the purple. Germanicus took the fight to the heart of the Cherusci lands, culminating in the Battle of Idistaviso in AD 16. One of the great things about archaeology is that it sometimes corroborates the historical record. That seems to be the case with the burial pits found at the site of the massacre. When Germanicus began his revenge campaign in AD 14, he encountered a battlefield still covered with the sun-bleached bones and remains of the fighting. He and his men buried the remains in pits and erected a mound on which they set up arms with the names of defeated Germanic tribes. (Hope, 2) Those pits were preserved and would later be discovered by archaeologists.
Regardless of the success Germanicus experienced in his AD 14-16 campaigns, it couldn’t change what happened in the Teutoburg Forest in AD 9. Germania Magna took its toll on him like it did every other Roman commander who tried to tame it. Casualties mounted, costs increased, and Tiberius finally had enough. He recalled Germanicus in late AD 16, and the border again reverted to the Rhine. The empire eventually moved on from Augustus’s policy and expanded in almost all directions, especially into Britain in the 40s. However, that dark, unconquerable frontier along the Rhine remained the empire’s limit until its fall in the fifth century. The three lost legions, XVII, XVIII, and XIX, were never reformed and replaced. They remained lost to history until the discovery of Marcus Caelius’s gravestone in the 17th century.
Bibliography
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Wilbers-Rost, Susanne, Birgit Großkopf, and Achim Rost. “The Ancient Battlefield at Kalkriese.” RCC Perspectives, no. 3 (2012): 91–111. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26240377.
Wells, Peter S. The Battle that Stopped Rome. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.
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